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Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Discussion Paper, ​Artificial Intelligence: 
Australia’s Ethics Framework ​(referred to as ‘the Paper’ here)​. ​We hope this is a starting point 
for an Australian conversation about how we respond to developments in data use, in 
particular in autonomous and intelligent decision-making systems (‘AI’). It is an important 
conversation for government, industry and academia, and also for civil society, Australian 
residents and citizens. ​The current and potential impacts of AI on our society are broad 
and deep - the discussion must match this. 
 
We do not see ethics​ ​as the only, or even most important frame for thinking about these 
issues. ​Ethics as described in the Paper, with its focus on setting aspirations for people and 
organisations, helps identify some expectations for using technologies of this kind, but on its 
own is unlikely to protect Australians or promote our aspirations, and too much focus on ethics 
risks detracting from asking even more important questions. Australia must also consider the 
role of regulation (in a range of fields, from privacy to intellectual property, competition to 
corporate governance, criminal justice and more) in managing risks and promoting well-being; 
we need to coordinate and promote research efforts in these fields and to innovate legal 
frameworks that strongly promote and protect rights. Other processes, such as the Australian 
Human Rights Commission Inquiry into Human Rights and Technology, and the ACCC Digital 
platforms inquiry, are part of this conversation.  
 
Any conversation about ethics must also expressly address structures and contexts 
significantly impacting how individuals and firms are or are not able to act consistently with 
ethical aspirations for AI. This includes incentive structures shaping behaviours, and how we 
address potential conflicts between commercial and ethical demands, as shown in problems 
identified by the Royal Commission into Banking. Another key question of context is 
concentrations of economic power in data aggregators; a particularly acute issue for Australia 
1 ​kimberlee.weatherall@sydney.edu.au​, contact author. 
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as a net importer of technology, despite the Paper’s implicit assumption that it is dealing only 
with Australian technology and AI developers.  2
 
Even accepting this Paper cannot resolve all these societal challenges, a broader framing still 
needs to be brought to the issues that the Paper identifies​. ​Understanding this affects how the 
draft Principles themselves need to be framed, and so we start this submission with the 
broader question (Q7) before turning more specifically to Principles and Tools (Qs 1-5). 
A broader view (Question 7) 
There are four ways we think Australia’s discussion about ethics and AI, as it progresses from 
here, needs a broader frame.  
1. A positive vision of beneficial outcomes 
First, while it is critical this Paper and framework consider risks​ ​and ways to manage them, it 
needs to balance this with the inclusion of a more positive vision for what is possible.​ Australia 
can and should be bolder, more positive and ambitious, promoting positive values 
widespread in our society, and aspiring to beneficial outcomes, including through the 
stimulation of civic technology development geared towards the public interest.​ Not only 
should we be aware of the positive potential and opportunities presented by AI, but we should 
actively assert it is our​ expectation​ of those developing, procuring and deploying these 
technologies that they will do so with this front of mind.  
 
Language and framing matter. If we frame AI as a question only of risk management, we may 
not aim, and almost certainly will fail, to achieve its positive potential. Thus, rather than a focus 
on ‘doing no harm’ or ‘net benefit’, we suggest a more aspirational vision, such as set out in 
the first two AI principles put forward by the OECD and endorsed by all OECD members, 
including Australia (after the Paper’s publication): 
 
AI should benefit people and the planet by driving inclusive growth, sustainable 
development, and well being. 
 
AI systems should be designed in a way that respects the rule of law, human rights, 
democratic values and diversity, and they should include appropriate safeguards - for 
example, enabling human intervention where necessary - to ensure a fair and just 
society.  3
 
2 ​The statement on p.15 of the Paper that “If any backlash occurs, they run the risk of making mistakes 
or being scapegoated” has very different implications depending on who ‘they’ refers to. 
3 OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence, adopted 22 May 2019, 
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/​.  OECD members and Non-OECD members Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Romania have endorsed the principles. 
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This second principle is particularly noteworthy. Intended benefits cannot be guaranteed. They 
will be promoted if we pay attention to requiring an evidence base before use of AI, incremental 
deployment, as well as ongoing review, with particular attention to legal and ethical 
best-practice. We return to these points below. For now, we should recognise that placing 
these positive values at the heart of operating principles for AI puts human values at the centre 
of and throughout cycles of design, deployment, evaluation and revision. 
2. Democratic values and diversity 
Our second​ ​point follows from the first: Australia’s domestic framework for AI should also 
reflect Australia’s commitments to human rights, the rule of law, and democratic values. This is 
true regardless of the audience for this framework: obviously it is relevant to governments 
using these technologies, but equally it is important for small and large private sector firms 
impacting the lives and opportunities of Australian citizens and residents. 
 
This leads to a broader point consistent with Australia’s democratic values. ​The process to 
develop an ethics framework for AI in Australia needs to be more inclusive, and 
proactively involve a broader set of perspectives than the immediate circle of 
stakeholders (industry, government, and academics) consulted to date.​ This needs to 
include conversations with civil society and citizens - as citizens actively involved in our society 
and its governance, not only as consumers of goods and services.  
 
It is not clear from the Paper how civil society organisations have been engaged, nor is there 
any breakdown of attendees for diversity, for instance by age, gender, education or ethnicity. 
Australia is one of the most multicultural countries in the world. To reflect the values, hopes 
and fears of the Australian public, this process must connect with diverse groups. We ask too if 
marginalised communities already active on these issues have been approached in appropriate 
ways, for instance, people involved in Indigenous Data Sovereignty? How we might take this 
process forward in a more inclusive way is discussed below (“What Next?”). 
3. The context of government 
Third,​ ​we need to recognise contexts that ought to limit how AI technology is used, and in 
which the identified Principles and Tools may be inadequate. In short, there are circumstances 
in which the context in which AI is being developed or deployed means that this framework is 
going to be insufficient. 
 
Development or deployment of technology by or for government is different and may 
demand a different approach. ​This is​ ​because: 
● People have less choice about whether to interact with or provide data to government; 
● Government holds unique power to affect people’s lives (you can’t just choose another 
government to provide services to you; government has unique power to deprive 
citizens and residents of liberty, and residents of the right to remain in Australia); 
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● Government has greater obligations of transparency to the governed, as a fundamental 
aspect of a democratic system, including obligations under freedom of information 
laws; obligations under administrative law to provide reasons for decisions etc.    4
Certain responsibilities of government should be non-delegable, and both government, and 
firms supplying government, may not be able to take the same approach they might with other 
clients (for example, asserting ‘trade secret’ claims in response to queries regarding the 
outputs or inputs of a system). The legal obligations imposed by public law are obviously 
beyond the scope of the Paper, but the moral or ethical obligations of government are not. Just 
as government has higher obligations in the justice system (the obligation to be a ‘model 
litigant’ ), it may be appropriate to see government as having obligations to be a ​‘model data 5
user/AI user​’, or moral or ethical ‘exemplars’ in this field.   6
We think it is a glaring omission that several prominent recent examples in Australia of 
controversial government data or AI use, and legal frameworks for data use, are not 
discussed in the Paper: Robodebt; My Health Record; the Telecommunications and Other 
Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Cth); The Capability.  
As noted further below, we say trust is a ​response​, and the critical goal is ​trustworthiness​ on 
the part of data collectors and users. If the federal government is interested in developing trust 
on the part of the Australian people, and more importantly the ​trustworthiness​ ​of government 
and other users of AI technology, it is important to confront existing concrete issues. The Paper 
ought to analyse Australian case studies and how the Principles might apply to them. 
Trustworthiness is surely improved when past problems are confronted and lessons learned 
are made visible and applied. 
On a related point, there is something distinct about politics​ ​as compared to other contexts. 
Even prior to Cambridge Analytica, research suggested Australians think ‘politics is different’ 
and that using data to manipulate citizens or the democratic system is unacceptable.   7
4. Other contexts of concentration and control 
Fourth, another question of context has been mentioned above: ​the increasing economic 
concentrations of power and data in a small number of large global firms; and, alongside 
4 ​For an analysis of the relevance of administrative law to questions of automated decision making, see 
eg T. Carney, ‘Robo-debt illegality: The seven veils​ ​of failed guarantees of the rule of law?’ (2019) 44 
Alternative Law Journal ​4-10. On the relevance of the rule of law more generally, see M. Zalnieriute, L. 
Bennett Moses and G. Williams, ‘The Rule of Law and Automation of Government Decision-Making’ 
(2019) 82 ​Modern Law Review ​425-455​.  
5 ​See the recent speech of Eugene Wheelahan QC: 
https://www.fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/seminars/ethics-seminar-series/20160315-eugene-wheel
ahan 
6 ​See per Finn J,​ ​Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia ​(1997) 76 FCR 151, 
196-197. 
7 See G. Goggin et al, ​Digital Rights in Australia ​(Research Report, November 2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3090774​. One of us (Weatherall) is a co-author of 
this research. 
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this, the absence of clear structures for ownership of, access to, and use of data​. This 
includes not just personal (or private) data, but also social data (such as datasets of 
de-identified citizen data that reveal much about society or communities). An ethics framework 
cannot ​solve ​these issues, which fall more in fields of law and policy. But the Paper should at 
least emphasise them and encourage awareness of the limitations of ethics to address them, 
supporting the advancement of appropriate regulatory frameworks. 
 
The Paper should also emphasise that practitioners need to recognise and account for context 
much more explicitly as it relates to particular projects or technologies.  Activities that are 8
acceptable in an ordinary commercial context (e.g. the fashion or travel trade) may not be in 
the area of personal finance, or health, in the home rental market or in the criminal justice 
system. We need ways to ensure these more detailed, contextual conversations take place. For 
example, we argue below that an important part of this ongoing process is for these Principles 
to be tested in live data projects - such as new government data projects. We would suggest 
too that significant industry bodies, or industry players, would also benefit from opening up 
data projects to civic involvement. We return to these points below (“What Next?”).  
The Principles (Questions 1-3) 
Consistent with the discussion above, we believe the Principles in their current draft form are 
incomplete. ​They embody a limited approach without also including a positive, 
aspirational vision​ of what Australian society, governments, firms and researchers should aim 
for. There are additional matters we would expect to see dealt with.  
 
Before making comments on specific draft Principles, we suggest it may be necessary to 
consider them more as a living statement reviewed and revised over time. This is a rapidly 
evolving field, and even in the last two years we have seen sets of ethical principles develop 
and build on each other. The OECD Principles quoted in this submission, the First Edition of 
the IEEE report ​Ethically Aligned Design of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (A/IS)​, the 
European Commission’s High Level Expert Group ​Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI​, and the 
Council of Europe’s draft ​Recommendation on Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data 
Processing and Different Forms of Artificial Intelligence​ were all published after the completion 
of the Paper. This also suggests there will be benefits to working collaboratively with other 
countries. 
Principles 1 and 2 (Net benefit; Do No Harm) 
We have argued above that these Principles are too narrow and negative. It is of course critical 
to avoid and mitigate harm, and net​ ​benefits are better than no benefits. But we think that 
these ideas can be incorporated as part of Principles that are more positively framed, either in 
8 ​See H. Nissenbaum, ​Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life​ (Palo Alto, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2010) and H. Nissenbaum ‘Contextual Integrity Up and Down the Data 
Food Chain’ (2019) 20 ​Theoretical Inquiries in Law​ 221. 
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language similar to the OECD’s or IEEE’s principles. There are no doubt others to draw on but 
these are two recent examples embodying the concepts identified in the Paper as part of a 
more positive aspiration: 
 
OECD Principles for Artificial Intelligence  IEEE First Edition 
AI should benefit people and the planet by 
driving inclusive growth, sustainable 
development, and well being. 
 
AI systems should be designed in a way that 
respects the rule of law, human rights, 
democratic values and diversity, and they 
should include appropriate safeguards - for 
example, enabling human intervention where 
necessary - to ensure a fair and just society. 
 
A/IS shall be created and operated to 
respect, promote, and protect internationally 
recognized human rights. 
 
A/IS creators shall adopt increased human 
well-being as a primary success criterion for 
development. 
 
Note too that both of these texts talk about ​well being​ and key Australian democratic values 
such as the ​rule of law​, respect for ​human rights​, ​diversity​ and ​democratic values​. All of 
these concepts are missing from the draft Principles, but all are important in order to reflect 
Australian values. Although the draft Principles refer to privacy, and fairness (conceived in part 
as requiring practitioners to avoid unfair discrimination), these do not represent a full statement 
of the fundamental rights Australians rightly expect to enjoy,  or Australia’s democratic values. 9
 
We also suggest the concept of ‘net benefit’ that is ‘greater than the cost’ and an obligation to 
‘minimise any negative outcomes’ suggests a simple quantitative trade-off. ​This is incomplete 
unless it includes a recognition that there must be ‘red lines’ – certain ‘costs’ or impacts 
that are unacceptable, and things that ought never be done. ​This should not be predicated, 
as the Paper suggests, on ​waiting ​for the emergence of “particularly harmful technologies.” 
Even acknowledging the Paper does not seek to address non-civilian technological 
development, there are contexts where civilian systems can impact human safety or may 
implicate the foundations of our democracy: such as systems designed to target political 
messages. We also note that it is not simply the ​net ​benefits versus costs that is relevant, it is 
the ​distribution​. It is unacceptable for significant costs to fall only on some groups, especially 
vulnerable or marginalised groups within society. 
9 To give just two examples, consider the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and 
freedom of opinion and expression (recognised in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Articles 18 and 19): when are these implicated by systems which include sentiment data in 
analysis that may affect a person’s rights (eg by limiting access to insurance, or a loan, or to 
employment prospects or continued employment)? Or consider the right to freedom of association 
(ICCPR Article 22). When is that implicated by systems that draw on analysis of networks, or social 
media networks or ‘likes’ in determining access to employment or educational opportunities? 
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Principle 3 (Legal and Regulatory Compliance) 
This is also too narrowly stated, especially in Australia in 2019, where there is no statutory or 
constitutional bill of rights at a federal level, and where privacy laws have not yet been 
reformed to better apply in the new digital and AI context (as compared to, say, Europe where 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has gone some way to updating privacy laws). 
Australia is in the midst of many debates about the adequacy of our legal framework to protect 
and promote respect for human rights. Hence Australian ​laws ​do not fully reflect Australian 
values ​which include respect for fundamental human rights, diversity and democracy.  
 
In any event, legal compliance is an obligation, but it is a legal obligation; ethical principles 
should be more ambitious and positive. ​As suggested above, we argue a better principle is 
one that refers to fundamental rights, the rule of law and democratic values. 
 
A case study implicating Principles 1-3 is cited in the Paper, though with glaring factual 
inaccuracies. The DeepMind-NHS case study, which has been the subject of thorough 
investigation by one of us,  is cited as an example “where the slow pace of regulatory 10
adaptation has hindered the development of potentially life-saving AI technologies.” In fact: (a) 
the relevant technology is a data-integration app, not an AI tool, as DeepMind has constantly 
asserted, and (b) the issue was not slow regulatory adaptation: it was that the UK data 
regulator found that the fully-identified health records of nearly 2 million people had been 
transferred without their knowledge, breaching UK law in four major respects. 
Principle 4 (Privacy Protection) 
The principle relating to privacy embodies an impoverished conception of privacy by 
international standards. It refers only to ‘privacy as secrecy’, and seems to posit all that is 
necessary to avoid privacy problems is consent. This reflects an incomplete understanding 
even of current Australian law, let alone developing international understandings as reflected in 
documents such as the GDPR or Convention 108. We defer to experts on privacy for further 
elaboration of these principles, including the initial response published by Salinger Privacy.  11
 
We also note in the Principles the absence of a recognition of the importance of 
individual autonomy and agency​. There is increasing concern regarding the potential of AI 
technologies to manipulate individuals, their information environment, their perception of 
reality, and/or their emotional state to achieve some goal of a third party. Such manipulation 
fundamentally undermines human ​dignity​ and can pose a threat, in some cases, to key 
societal interests including the integrity of democratic systems. Respect for human autonomy 
and data agency is commonly mentioned in other statements of principles and ought to be 
10 ​J. Powles and H. Hodson, ‘Google DeepMind and Healthcare in an Age of Algorithms’ (2017) 7 ​Health 
and Technology​ 351; ‘Response to DeepMind’ (2018) 8 ​Health and Technology​ 15. 
11 ​https://www.salingerprivacy.com.au/2019/04/27/ai-ethics/​.  
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recognised in these Principles. Research being done by the 3A Institute in Canberra on 
autonomy and agency in cyber physical systems could also inform thinking here.  
Principle 5 (Fairness) 
Fairness is clearly a fundamental value that must be included in the Principles. However, the 
conceptualisation of fairness included in the Core Principles table (page 6) is incomplete. The 
text focuses on avoiding bias against individuals, communities or groups - i.e. broadly a focus 
on avoiding discrimination - which is undoubtedly important, though in its computational 
formulation can be problematic and is certainly insufficient.  A positive vision of fairness also 12
incorporates an aspiration to use the technology to work towards a more just, fair and 
inclusive society.  
Principle 6 (Transparency and Explainability) 
Transparency and explainability support trustworthiness and accountability of AI. We think the 
description of this principle is again narrow: it refers only to people knowing what data was 
used: not how, why, or if a different result might be achieved. Questions around what level of 
transparency is possible or achievable are a matter of significant debate and considerable 
research globally; tools are changing all the time. Some sets of principles internationally 
identify broader aspirations for transparency: that it ought to be possible to reduce an AI 
system’s computations (not just inputs/outputs) to a form comprehensible by humans.  
While there is no doubt room for considerable and ongoing debate about what transparency 
requires, it is a mistake to ​limit ​transparency to a statement about inputs and outputs only. 
Perhaps, as a more positive vision, it might be desirable to advocate for transparency about 
both data and computational processes, in a form that is appropriate to audiences of different 
levels of technical competency. We note too that the imperative for transparency is greater for 
systems developed or used by government, consistent with the discussion above. 
Principles 7 and 8 (Contestability and Accountability) 
Regarding​ ​contestability​ ​(again an important principle), the principle as currently stated limits 
contestability to ​a person ​who is ​impacted​. Whether it is appropriate to limit contestability in 
this way may depend on context. There are areas of the law where rulings can be contested by 
interested parties, or even parties who do not have an immediate interest, because allowing 
contestation is in the public interest. For example, standing rules to challenge decisions are 
deliberately generous in the grant of intellectual property rights, to enable interested parties 
who are not immediately impacted nevertheless to assist IP Australia to identify property rights 
that ought not to have been granted. It is also important that the ​group ​and ​systemic 
implications of AI systems are capable of contest and account, given that it is inherent to the 
12 ​J. Powles and H. Nissenbaum, ‘The Seductive Diversion of ‘Solving’ Bias in Artificial Intelligence’, 
https://medium.com/s/story/the-seductive-diversion-of-solving-bias-in-artificial-intelligence-890df5e5ef5
3​.  
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operation of many of these systems that they operate across populations, and that there are 
people and groups dramatically implicated by imperfect modelling. 
 
The accountability​ ​principle could also be better stated. It currently says that responsible 
persons/organisations should be identifiable and accountable. This is narrow compared to the 
international discussion of accountability in this area, which grapples with questions such as 
the need to ensure that both developers and deployers of systems retain some responsibility 
for systems; and that some responsibilities/accountabilities are non-delegable. The principle as 
currently framed would allow entities to shift risk to others, including shifting risks to firms or 
individuals who will be unable to provide effective redress should something go wrong. 
Accountability needs to land with the right people or institutions​ - the people or institutions 
with the power to do something about the problem, or offer compensation or remediation. It 
would not be ok, for example, for a government agency which has outsourced a decision to 
simply ‘blame the technology’ or seek to shift all liability to the outsourced provider. 
What else is missing? 
We think there are a number of omissions worth noting.  
 
There is no reference to the need to ensure ​responsible governance ​when developing and 
implementing AI. Governance relates to the systems around​ ​AI, such as for data quality, 
security and privacy, for implementation, monitoring and evaluation, for appropriately allocating 
responsibilities for outcomes. Thinking about ethical choices that might confront a developer or 
firm commissioned to produce a system, these are relevant considerations.  
 
Also relevant is the more specific concept of ​data governance and data integrity. ​The Paper 
recognises the centrality of data, as well as the challenges of getting ‘good’ data. But the 
Principles in their current form do not recognise that evaluation of the quality or relevance of 
data (and crucially, what is ​not ​in the data but is ​important​) should be a key consideration in 
deciding when to go ahead with use of a system. It may be unethical to go ahead if the data 
quality is insufficient for sound analysis or decision-making. For instance, assumptions about 
the value of attributes in a dataset can perpetuate existing biases and inequity. Whether and 
how to use an AI system, and how much oversight, monitoring and evaluation is required, 
should turn in part on the quality of underlying data, and how it is interpreted and used.  
 
The Principles also do not mention the imperative of ​ongoing evaluation​ of systems. Although 
ongoing monitoring is mentioned as a ​tool​, this is insufficient given the approach in the Paper 
of listing a series of tools without asserting that any of them are obligatory.  
We note these considerations about governance and evaluation could be stated as a principle, 
or, as other submissions we have seen in draft suggested, it might be appropriate to 
distinguish between a set of ethical ​principles​, and a set of ​requirements for trustworthy AI. 
We note this approach is adopted in the European Commission’s High Level Expert Group 
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Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI​, which states core ethical principles and then 7 key 
‘requirements’ for trustworthy AI to be implemented, which are: human agency and oversight, 
technical robustness and safety, privacy and data governance, transparency, diversity, 
non-discrimination and fairness, environmental and societal well-being, accountability. 
The Tools (Questions 4-6) 
The Tools proposed in the paper may all help. Others that may help include DotEveryone’s 
consequence scanning , created for agile development processes, and the ODI’s Data Ethics 13
Canvas , developed for data projects. Atul Gawande’s Checklists  reminds this simple old 14 15
tool is still a powerful way to help experts reduce errors. And this is a fast-evolving field, so 
available tools will also evolve. Rather than have a static document it may be necessary to 
have an updateable site, wiki or document. Tools themselves can be set up to evolve: Canada 
for example has placed its Algorithmic Impact Assessment questionnaire on Github.    16
 
We note however, that any tool can become a weapon, and any tool can be misused. 
Whether it works depends on how it is used, in what context, and within what governance and 
incentive structures.​ ​For instance, what good is a checklist or impact assessment exercise 
assigned to a junior employee, where a project lead’s primary KPI is to close a deal or ship a 
product? The Royal Commission into Banking illustrates how even clear rules and compliance 
systems within a flawed governance and incentive structure fail to protect Australians.  
On a related point about the culture in which technologies and tools are used, we note that the 
Paper frequently refers to the importance of the Australian public as the overarching context 
and culture for all these considerations, but shares no strategy for how it will engage the public 
in this process, and no tools that governments or firms seeking to deploy these technologies 
might consider in order to engage the public. Perhaps this is because it is a first step on a long 
road. But we note now that the expectation of any public consultation to simply ​‘build it and 
they will come’​ is not fair given the complexity and impact of the issues at play here. The onus 
is on this process to ensure it is inclusive. We turn to this point now, in considering the 
question: “What Next?” 
What next? 
The Paper and this consultation are a good start for what needs to be ​an iterative process 
involving both experts and diverse communities across Australia. Using expert feedback from 
this first phase of the consultation to iterate the framework and workshop it with diverse groups 
of Australians is a good next step to make this process ​adaptive and​ ​democratic, not fixed 
and technocratic​. This will also help develop norms and ways to manage change over time. 
13  ​https://doteveryone.org.uk/project/consequence-scanning/ 
14 ​https://theodi.org/article/data-ethics-canvas/ 
15 ​http://atulgawande.com/book/the-checklist-manifesto/ 
16 ​https://canada-ca.github.io/aia-eia-js/  
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We encourage Data61 to think about this process as creatively as possible, including using AI 
tools as a diagnostic to identify whether and how different actors influence process and 
outputs, and if necessary to correct and address biased sampling. We would welcome the 
opportunity to be part of any such future work. 
 
To ensure ​an inclusive process promoting positive public potential​ alongside an expert 
process limiting risks, and consistent with our emphasis on the importance of democratic 
values and a broader frame, we argue the approach needs to shift from​ ​‘consult’ to​ ​‘​involve​’ 
and from ‘experts only’​ ​to​ ​‘​experts and the public​’. The International Association of Public 
Participation’s ‘Spectrum of Public Participation’  ​provides a framework for how to shift from 17
‘consult’ to ‘involve’, to understand and consider people’s hopes and fears. To be more 
inclusive, ‘the public’ involved must include civil society groups, and a diversity of 
perspectives, for instance by age, gender, education, ethnicity. In particular, voices from 
marginalised and vulnerable communities must be heard and considered. 
 
The UK’s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) is using an approach like this to develop 
its ethical principles. It has chosen not to fix a framework early on, instead sharing a set of 
objectives (which, in some ways, mirror the Principles in the Paper) and a process for how it 
will engage both experts and the public.​ ​The Centre ‘puts the public first’ and has run sessions 
to explore people’s hopes and fears, sharing these events via blogs, videos and social media. 
The CDEI also aims to collaborate with similar organisations globally and of course this 
process will benefit from such collaboration too.  
 
At the same time, ​case studies specific to Australia​ must be considered, and draft Principles 
tested against them. Specific concerns about​ ​Robodebt, My Health Record, The Access & 
Assurance Bill and The Capability (none of which, as noted earlier, is mentioned in the Paper) 
must be sought out and included if this process is to be seen as independent of government. 
These case studies will also provide learnings for future work. 
 
As the Principles evolve, they must also be tested on live data projects, to see how they 
work in practice, when competing interests arise, and trade offs have to be considered. 
For instance, the banking, healthcare and transport sectors all provide opportunities to do this. 
The introduction of open banking here will raise hard, tangible questions about how individual 
consent works in practice when multiple providers are involved (eg a customer, their bank, and 
a third party provider) or when competing parties are involved (eg a bank and a third party 
provider). Many highly sensitive issues about data involving multiple people, for instance in 
healthcare, need to be tested with the Principles and new technologies. And the transport 
sector could provide a useful test for the Principles as they apply between organisations, as 
the sector works to balance how public and private operators fund and share physical and 
data infrastructure, competing in novel ways that are changing markets.   
 
17 ​https://www.iap2.org.au/About-Us/About-IAP2-Australasia-/Spectrum 
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Confronted with new technologies which can both help and harm us, we have the chance to 
enrich our hopes and ambitions for ourselves, each other and our country, as well as other 
open economies and democracies around the world. Working together, we can manage risk in 
positive ways, consider civil rights and democratic principles alongside consumer rights, 
engage with a broad range of voices, foster agency and action around AI and data, and 
support the long-term resilience of our democracy and economy. The depth of expertise in 
Australia, and the energy and creativity of the public can be a powerful combination for 
capturing the benefits of these new technologies together. We welcome the opportunity to be 
part of any such future work. 
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